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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Hans Landsberg and Sam Schurr each led research teams that produced two important 
energy futures policy studies that were published in 1979. The conclusions, policy 
recommendations, and energy demand, supply, and price forecasts contained in these 
studies are reviewed.  Developments in U.S. energy policy over the last 25 years are 
discussed and compared with the recommendations contained in the two studies.  The 
projections of energy demand, supply, and prices for 2000 contained in the studies is 
presented and compared to actual realizations.   The nature, magnitudes, and reasons for 
the differences between the studies’ forecasts and what actually emerged 25 years later 
are discussed.  All things considered, the Landsberg and Schurr studies have stood the 
test of time very well.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
About 25 years ago several comprehensive “energy futures” policy studies were 
released to the public.2  They were released just as the disruption in oil supplies from Iran 
was causing oil prices to rise to unprecedented levels, the accident at the Three Mile 
Island nuclear power plant was shaking the nuclear power industry, and President Carter 
was preparing the public to respond to a long term energy crisis requiring efforts of a 
magnitude that would be the “moral equivalent of war” (Stagliano, pp. 31-33).  These 
energy futures studies endeavored to identify the nation’s energy problems and to 
propose public policies to help to ameliorate them.  The leaders of the teams responsible 
for two of these studies were Sam Schurr and Hans Landsberg. 
This is a good opportunity to look back at the energy policy recommendations, 
forecasts and supporting analysis contained in the two studies led, respectively by Sam 
Schurr (the “RFF study”) and Hans Landsberg (the “Ford Study”)3 with the benefit of 
nearly 25 years of policy experience and realizations of energy demand, supply, and 
prices.   As Jonathan Koomey et. al. argue in their paper in this volume, retrospective 
studies can be very useful from a number of different perspectives.  This paper reflects 
this general view.  The paper proceeds in the following way.  I first review the major 
conclusions of the two studies and their explicit or (sometimes) implicit policy 
recommendations.  Second, I offer a brief and necessarily incomplete review of the major 
features of U.S. energy policy over the last 25 years in the context of the policy 
                                                 
2 These studies included  Schurr (1979), Landsberg (1979), Stobaugh and Yergin (1979) and National 
Academy of Sciences (1979).  
3This “Ford Study” should be distinguished from the Ford Foundation Energy Policy Project led by S. 
David Freeman which released its conclusions about energy policy in “A Time to Choose, America’s 
Energy Future,” in 1974.  Indeed, Energy: The Next Twenty Years, the Ford Study discussed here, and 
another Ford Foundation sponsored study Nuclear Power: Issues and Choices, published in 1977, were in 
part a reaction to the view that the conclusions of the 1974 study gave too little the role of market forces. 
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recommendations made in these studies.  Finally, I examine the patterns of energy 
consumption and energy supply anticipated by the RFF and Ford studies, compare them 
with the actual supply and consumption patterns realized in 2000, and discuss how they 
have been affected by policy decisions and unanticipated changes in the structure of the 
U.S. economy.  There is much wisdom contained in these two studies that both reflect 
“lessons learned” from experience with energy policies over the decades before the 
studies were conducted (Goodwin) and are still relevant today.  
 
II.  THE RFF AND FORD STUDIES: REALITIES AND POLICY 
PRESCRIPTIONS 
 
To fully appreciate the studies prepared by the teams led by Schurr and Landsberg 
we must recall the context in which they were written (Stagliano, pp. 19-43).  In the 
1977-79 period when the studies were being prepared, there was widespread public 
concern about additional disruptions in world oil supplies, energy shortages, rising 
energy prices, slow economic growth and rapid inflation.  Prices for virtually all sources 
of energy were regulated by the federal government. Shortages of natural gas in particular 
were growing and the gasoline lines of 1973-74 were hard to forget.  Many opinion 
makers pitched the ideas (individually or in combination) that the world was running out 
of energy, that energy markets could not be trusted to work well, and that various evil 
doers in the energy industry were conspiring to keep prices high while thwarting cheap 
“soft energy path” opportunities from being made available to the public.  At the same 
time, coal and nuclear power were facing increasing challenges on environmental and 
safety grounds.  President Carter’s first energy plan, and the legislation that flowed from 
it, reflected the view that there was a very serious energy crisis facing the country, that 
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markets were the problem rather than the solution, and that what was needed were 
massive government initiatives to subsidize alternative energy supply sources and to 
mandate end-use efficiency standards while shielding the public from higher energy 
prices.  The RFF and Ford studies were a reaction to the hysteria and the flawed policy 
initiatives that were rampant in the late 1970s. 
In 1979, a Resources for the Future (RFF) research team, led by Sam Schurr as 
Project Director, published the book Energy in America’s Future (the “RFF Study”).   
The book begins with the following insightful observations regarding the challenges 
confronting energy policy implementation: 
“There are many reasons why U.S. energy policy remains in dispute, but at least 
four problems come to mind in explaining the specific motivations that gave rise 
to this book and the basis on which its contribution to policy dialogue might be 
judged: 
 
1. There is disagreement --- and even some ignorance --- about some 
fundamental facts. 
2. There is great uncertainty about what results the most commonly suggested 
energy policies might produce. 
3. It is painful to choose between short-term and long term objectives.  What is 
best for us this year may make things very unpleasant in 1990 --- and vice 
versa. 
4. There is no clear national consensus on what the major long-term goals of 
U.S. energy policy should be.” (RFF Study, page 1) 
 
The RFF study endeavored to address all of these “…barriers to a workable, 
acceptable energy policy for our nation,” (RFF Study, p. 1).  The study contains a 
comprehensive empirical analysis of energy consumption drivers, the relationships 
between energy consumption and economic growth, and technological opportunities to 
use energy more efficiency (technically and economically).  It contains a detailed 
discussion of mineral resource and production cost information; conventional electricity 
supply technologies, focusing on nuclear and coal; and non-conventional supply 
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alternatives, focusing on synthetic fuels, solar and other renewable and decentralized 
“alternative” supply technologies.  It clearly recognizes the interdependencies between 
energy consumption and production choices and their environmental impacts.   
While the RFF study does not recommend a set of “best policies” it provides a 
thoughtful framework for considering energy policies choices in the context of 
uncertainty and the international setting in which U.S. energy choices and consequences 
are embedded.  According to the RFF study, a primary motivation for energy policy 
actions is to reduce dependence on imported oil and natural gas from unstable areas of 
the world and to move the country gradually on to a path that can adapt to what were 
anticipated to be significant long run increases in the prices of oil and natural gas 
reflecting the higher costs of extracting oil and natural gas and the costs of meeting 
tighter environmental regulations.4  However, the RFF study rejected the “we are running 
out of energy” perspective that was popular it the time. It took the clear view that the 
resource base was adequate to support growing world oil and gas consumption for at least 
a decade “… at cost levels not much higher than current prices.” (RFF Study, p. 425). 
 Among the policies discussed favorably in the RFF study are strategic storage, 
diversifying the sources of oil and gas supplies, reducing petroleum demand to lower the 
probability of disruption, policies to remove market and non-market barriers to expand 
domestic fuel supplies (nuclear, synthetic fuels, solar energy) and to encourage more 
efficient use of energy by consumers (“conservation”).  The book emphasizes the 
importance of relying primarily on price signals and removing the then prevailing price 
controls on oil and natural gas and the desirability of targeting government interventions 
                                                 
4 Though the RFF study took the clear view that the resource base was adequate to support growing world 
oil and gas consumption for at least a decade “… at cost levels not much higher than current prices.” (RFF 
Study, p. 425). 
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at market failures.  Finally, the RFF study envisions a future energy system that involves 
a balanced combination of increased supplies from a variety of domestic conventional 
and some new sources plus significant improvements in energy efficiency.   
The RFF study forecasts that aggregate energy consumption will continue 
growing, but at a slower rate than in the past, reflecting higher energy prices and 
increases in economical energy efficiency opportunities.  The RFF study is particularly 
optimistic about efficiency improvements in residential heating, automobiles, process 
steam, and cogeneration.   On the supply side it views the economics of nuclear vs. coal 
electricity generation as being reasonably favorable to nuclear, implicitly assuming that 
oil and natural gas will be too costly to use in the generation of electricity.  While the 
book has a very positive assessment of the economic prospects for cogeneration, it is not 
particular bullish about widespread economical use of solar heating, photovoltaics, or 
wind except in a few locations with favorable technical and economic attributes. The 
book recognizes that these supply resources are unlikely to be economical unless real oil 
prices double from the level prevailing at the time.  The study is sympathetic to 
government subsidies to advance the development of commercial synthetic fuel 
technologies based on the belief that these subsidies are justified by a variety of market 
failures, while recognizing that the costs of synthetic fuels are likely to be double the real 
price of oil prevailing in 1979.  Indeed, synthetic fuels and shale oil appear to be the 
“backstop” technologies that cap oil prices at about twice the then prevailing prices. 
At about the same time in 1979, a Ford Foundation Study Energy: The Next 
Twenty Years was published.  The study group made up of distinguished economists, was 
chaired by Hans Landsberg.  This study had the same goals and came to similar 
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conclusions as did Energy in America’s Future, though the former contains more detailed 
empirical analysis of resources, costs and technological options than the latter.  However, 
the Ford study, clearly more concerned about the perceived gridlock in energy policy 
formation, and probably reflecting Landsberg’s frustrations about energy policy 
formation (Landsberg 1983), focuses more on identifying a set of crisp “realities” and 
promoting a specific set of policy recommendations. Both the realities and the policy 
recommendations are worth noting (my paraphrasing): 
Reality One:  The world is not running out of energy.  There are abundant energy 
resources at prices not much more than double those prevailing in 1979.  
Reality Two: Middle East oil holds great risks, but is so valuable that the world 
will be dependent on it for a long time.  The U.S. and its allies are vulnerable to serious 
economic disruptions due to supply disruptions in the Middle East.  Dependence on the 
Middle East can only be reduced slowly.  
Reality Three:  Higher energy costs cannot be avoided, but can be contained by 
letting prices rise to reflect them.  The higher costs need not have severe effects on 
economic welfare or lifestyles if they are properly managed.  It is a dangerous 
misconception to think that government can somehow provide dependable, clean and 
plentiful energy cheaply.  Most importantly, energy prices must be allowed to rise to 
reflect economic realities.  In its internal discussions, the Ford team used the assumption 
that real world oil prices would double from their mid-1979 level by 2000, but oil prices 
could be anywhere in the $20 to $30/barrel range (in $1979 --- roughly $40 to $60 per 
barrel in 2002 prices). 
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Reality Four:  Environmental effects of energy use are serious and hard to 
manage.  The need to reduce environmental costs will be a major cause of rising energy 
costs.  
Reality Five:  Conservation is an essential “source” of energy in large quantities.  
Energy conservation cannot be mandated or managed centrally, but requires that 
information and incentives be provided to energy users who make their own adjustments. 
Reality Six:  Serious shocks and surprises are certain to occur in the form of short-
term supply interruptions and price instability in world oil markets.  But there will also be 
pleasant surprises, regarding new supply and conservation technologies.  
Reality Seven:  Sound R&D policy is essential, but there is no simple technical 
fix.  
 
In light of these “realities,” the Ford study made nine major policy 
recommendations: 
 
Recommendation 1: Decontrol oil and gas producer prices.   
Recommendation 2: Make regulated electricity prices to consumes better reflect 
real costs, by applying marginal cost pricing principles and pricing backup capacity 
economically.  
Recommendation 3:  Use science and technology to generate and define basic 
options, while relying primarily on the private sector to develop and deploy technology.  
Pursue large-scale government financed demonstration projects selectively and with great 
care.  
Recommendation 4:  Adopt a different approach to air pollution control.  “Air 
pollution control should focus on providing incentives for making progress toward 
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cleaner air in a way that is cost-effective over time. Emissions charges, marketable 
discharge permits, and similar market-like devices should be used.”  
Recommendation 5: Prepare for disruption in world oil markets by developing an 
effective stockpile program and by using market forces to manage stockpiles and crises. 
Recommendation 6:  Continue efforts to reduce the problems associated with 
nuclear power and improve long run nuclear options.  Reprocessing nuclear fuel and 
breeder reactors will not be economical for many years into the future.  
Recommendation 7:  Work to improve the acceptability of coal, facilitate its use in 
industry and electricity generation, and learn as much as possible as soon as possible 
about the carbon dioxide problem.   
Recommendation 8:  Vigorously pursue conservation as an economical energy 
source.  Temporarily subsidize energy conservation investments until energy supplies are 
properly priced.  Increase “non-hardware” research to better understand the barriers faced 
by consumers in making wise appliance/equipment choice and energy consumption 
decisions.  Aggressively market energy conservation to consumers. 
Recommendation 9:  Remove impediments to use of solar energy. 
As I will discuss in more detail below, many of these recommendations were 
reflected in energy policy initiatives over the last 25 years. 
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III.   WHY DO WE NEED NATIONAL ENERGY POLICIES? 
The RFF and Ford studies were both motivated, in part, by the view that sensible 
energy policy was being thwarted by the absence of a clear articulation of energy policy 
goals and by conflicting views about the underlying attributes of energy supply and 
demand and their associated uncertainties upon which energy policy must be based.  This 
state of affairs is not surprising for at least two sets of reasons.  First, interest in energy 
policy does in fact reflect multiple goals whose relative importance has ebbed and flowed 
over time.  Second, energy policies can have very significant distributional impacts --- on 
different industries, different regions of the country, on the well-being of Americans in 
different income groups, and on different countries around the world.  The large and 
multidimensional distributional impacts inevitably stimulate complex and aggressive 
interest group politics to influence public perceptions about the nature of energy policy 
problems, to promote policies that favor one interest group over another, and to make the 
definition and efficient implementation of sound energy policies difficult.   
Even after 25 years, there is still not widespread agreement about the absolute or 
relative importance of various energy policy goals.  Energy policies are derivative 
policies reflecting a number of higher level policy objectives and considerations.5 
a. Important infrastructure sectors essential for economic growth and 
development:  While interest in energy policy issues increased significantly 
after the oil shocks in the 1970s and 1980s, energy resource and policy issues 
attracted scholarly research and policy interest long before then.  Sam Schurr, 
Hans Landsberg, the staff at RFF and many other scholars and policymakers 
                                                 
5 The list is not meant to be exhaustive.  Clearly, income distribution concerns have played a role in energy 
policy formation and implementation.  So too have market imperfections which may make it difficult for 
consumers to make rational investments in energy-using structures, equipment and appliances.  This section 
draws heavily on Joskow (2002). Goodwin (1981) contains a very interesting set of essays about U.S. 
energy policy from the 1930s until 1979, focusing primarily on the post World War II period.   Stagliano  
(2001) briefly reviews this earlier history as well, but focuses on the development of energy policy in the 
early 1990s.  
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pursued work on energy and related natural resource issues long before the 
U.S. imported significant quantities of oil, before OPEC existed, and before 
Persian Gulf supply disruptions led to price spikes, recessions and public 
concerns about the “energy crisis.”6  Economical and reliable supplies of 
energy play an important role in fostering economic growth and development. 
Energy, like transportation and telecommunications services, is a key 
intermediate input into most sectors of a developed economy.  Distortions in 
prices, consumption, supply, or reliability of energy infrastructure services can 
lead to large economic and social costs.   
 
b. Energy Security Concerns:  National security considerations have served as a 
rationale for energy policy initiatives going back to the period before World 
War II (Goodwin 1981). As imports of foreign oil increased, the potential 
adverse economic impact of oil supply disruptions in particular clearly has 
been a primary motivation for interest in energy policy since the mid-1970s.  
The Ford and RFF studies reflected and reinforced these economic concerns.  
However, empirical studies of the business cycle and economic welfare costs 
on the U.S. economy of energy supply disruptions are not consistent with the 
view that these costs are enormous.7  Nevertheless, even if these costs are not 
as large as many policymakers seem to think, government policies that 
anticipate or respond to energy price shocks can still affect their magnitude 
either positively or negatively depending on the wisdom of the policies that 
are implemented. 
 
c. Environmental Impacts:  The combustion of fossil fuels is the primary source 
of air pollution targeted by environmental policies aimed at cleaning the air 
(NOx, SO2, CO, etc.) and accounts for most of the production of CO2, a 
greenhouse gas generally thought to be a major contributor to global climate 
change.8 The RFF and Ford studies both clearly recognized the importance of 
the interactions between energy and environmental policies and took the 
position that there was no fundamental conflict between increased energy 
consumption and improving environmental quality.  The Ford study 
emphasized the desirability of relying more on market-based instruments to 
internalize environmental externalities and identified CO2 emissions as an 
emerging environmental challenge. 
 
d. Competition Policy:  Important segments of the U.S. energy sector, in 
particular electric power and natural gas, have been subject to price and entry 
regulation for almost a century.  These regulatory institutions have important 
implications for the performance of these important infrastructure sectors and, 
                                                 
6 For example, President’s Materials Policy Commission (1952)., “Resources for Freedom:  A Report to the 
President, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952.   
7 For example, Bohi and Toman (1993), and Bohi (1991).  However, a recent study by de Miguel, Manzano 
and Martin-Moreno (2003) finds that oil price shocks imposed significant costs on the Spanish economy. 
8 Energy production and delivery also have significant potential impacts on water quality, water 
temperature, and land use. Environmental policies necessarily affect energy markets and energy policies 
necessarily have environmental effects. 
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therefore, for the performance of the economy.  U.S. competition policies 
continually reexamine the rationale for and performance of price and entry 
regulation.  Poor sector performance, as well as technological and economic 
changes that undermine the case for price and entry regulation, can make it 
desirable to design and implement competition policies that restructure 
regulated industries to expand opportunities for competition and shrink the 
expanse of price and entry regulation. However, aside from the 
recommendations to decontrol oil and natural gas prices, the Ford and RFF 
studies give essentially no consideration to more fundamental changes in the 
structure and role of competition in the gas and electricity sectors. 
 
e. Use of Publicly-owned Resources:  A significant fraction of domestic energy 
resources lie on or under land that is controlled by the federal government 
(and to a lesser extent state governments) and this fraction has been 
increasing.  Hydroelectric resources lie on rivers and in locations subject to 
state or federal jurisdiction. The federal government has no choice but to 
develop and implement policies which define how these lands can be used for 
energy exploration and production.  These policies also have impacts on the 
environment that further complicate the interactions between energy and 
environmental policies. The RFF and Ford studies recognized the need to 
optimize the use of energy resources on federal lands in an environmentally 
sensitive manner. 
 
The energy policy-making and implementation process has several enduring 
features that have limited its success in achieving these and other sensible goals.  First, 
there has never been sustained national leadership to develop and pursue a long-term 
energy policy program or to convince Americans that energy supply and demand are 
things that they should be concerned about.  Instead, policy initiatives have been 
stimulated by short term supply shocks that have led to public concern about rising prices 
or shortages of fuel.  These concerns stimulate demands (or opportunities) for something 
to be done by government, policy proposals are made and sometimes implemented, the 
impacts of the supply shocks and public reaction abate and the interest in energy policy 
quickly fades away soon after.  
Second, the one proven way to reduce energy demand in the long run is to raise 
energy prices by allowing energy markets to function with unregulated prices and to 
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reflect energy security and environmental externalities in energy prices by applying taxes 
or tradeable permits mechanisms to internalize the associated externalities.  But the 
interest of Americans in energy policy issues is triggered by price increases and the 
public expects that policies will reduce prices.  Politicians generally view supporting  
policies that would transparently increase energy prices as not being career enhancing 
decisions.  Indeed, at the time the Ford and RFF studies were released, decontrol of oil 
and natural gas prices had only limited public support, despite the fact that there was 
growing evidence that the price controls on petroleum and the associated entitlements 
system were not constraining consumer prices significantly and that natural gas price 
controls were responsible for growing shortages (Arrow and Kalt, Smith and Phelps, 
Rogers).  Accordingly, energy policy initiatives have tended to rely on the provision of 
targeted financial incentives of various kinds, R&D funds, and mandatory energy 
efficiency standards applicable to automobiles, appliances, new buildings, and industrial 
equipment.   
Third, energy policy debates are always extremely contentious and tend to reflect  
regional interests at least as much as partisan Democrat vs. Republican politics.  They pit 
energy production states against energy consuming states.  They pit big oil, gas, and 
utility companies against consumer groups --- including industrial consumer groups --- 
fighting for lower prices.  The unfortunate history of natural gas price controls during the 
1960s and 1970s is perhaps the clearest example of a contest between energy consuming 
and energy producing states (MacAvoy 2000).  And increasingly over time, energy policy 
debates have become intertwined with environmental policy debates since energy 
production and use is the major contributor to air pollution, hazardous waste depositions, 
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and land and water use issues.  The confrontations between traditional “supply side” 
policies focused on increasing domestic energy supplies and “demand-side” policies built 
around energy conservation, renewable energy, and alternative vehicle initiatives, has 
continued to intensify over time.   
 
IV. THE LAST 25 YEARS OF ENERGY POLICY THROUGH THE LENS OF 
THE RFF/FORD STUDIES 
 
 As discussed above, the Ford Study made a set of nine major policy 
recommendations.  These recommendations are generally consistent with those made or 
implied, less crisply, in the RFF study.  How do these recommendations compare to the 
actual course of energy policy since 1978?  I will focus here on a subset of these 
recommendations: 
 a.  Decontrol oil and natural gas prices:  The deregulation of oil and natural gas 
prices was accomplished, quickly in the case of oil and more slowly in the case of natural 
gas.  Price controls on oil were implemented as part of President Nixon’s anti-inflation 
policies prior to the first oil shock in 1973-74.  In 1975, President Ford signed the Energy 
Policy and Conservation Act, extending price controls on oil and implementing the crude 
oil entitlements program to allocate “old” price controlled oil (Kalt).  Controls on the 
field price of natural gas sold in interstate commerce began in the 1950s, with regulatory 
obligations thrust on the Federal Power Commission by federal court decisions 
reinterpreting the provisions of the Natural Gas Act of 1938.   By the mid-1970s, these 
price controls had created increasingly severe shortages of natural gas (MacAvoy and 
Pindyck).   
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In late 1978 Congress passed the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA).  The NGPA, 
began the deregulation of “new gas” supplies while continuing price regulation of “old 
gas” supplies.   Two months after President Carter signed the NGPA into law along with 
several other pieces of energy policy legislation, Iran ceased exporting oil following the 
Shah’s overthrow, leading to an explosion in world oil prices.   In April 1979, President 
Carter, responding to growing oil and gas shortages in the U.S., announced the gradual 
decontrol of oil prices.   Then in early 1981, the President Reagan responded to the oil 
crisis of 1978-1980 by removing remaining price and allocation controls on the oil 
industry. The Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989 completely removed the price 
controls on wellhead prices of natural gas with the last vestiges of field price regulation 
ended in January 1993. 
  The deregulation of natural gas prices went even further (beyond the “field”) 
than the authors of the RFF and Ford studies had contemplated.  Beginning in 1985, a 
series of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) initiatives led to the 
unbundling of interstate pipeline transportation of natural gas from the sale of commodity 
natural gas itself, ultimately making it possible for local distribution companies, 
electricity generators and large industrial users to purchase commodity natural gas 
directly from producers or through intermediaries in unregulated competitive natural gas 
markets, purchasing transportation service separately at prices that were capped by FERC 
regulation. These restructuring, deregulation and regulatory reform initiatives led to the 
development of competitive markets for natural gas at a growing number of trading hubs, 
markets for gas storage, secondary markets for pipeline capacity, the development of a 
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vibrant gas marketing industry, and the creation of financial derivatives markets giving 
wholesale gas consumers a wide range of contracting and risk management options.   
b.  Regulated electricity prices should more closely reflect the marginal cost of 
supplying electricity:  Retail electricity prices are regulated by the states through their 
public utility commissions.  At the time the RFF and Ford studies where written, it was 
widely believed that cost-of-service regulation was keeping electricity prices below the 
marginal supply cost of electricity and that electricity prices generally did not properly 
reflect variations in marginal cost between peak and off peak periods.  Title I of the 
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) required states to determine 
whether they would introduce new pricing mechanisms to encourage more efficient 
utilization of electricity. Title II of PURPA obligated electric utilities to purchase power 
from cogeneration plants and small power production facilities using renewable and 
waste fuels.   At the time PURPA was passed, Title I received much more attention than 
did Title II.   In response to Title I, and after the RFF and Ford studies were published, 
each of the states went through a process to determine whether and how they would 
adjust electric and gas utility rate structures to provide better incentives to consumers, 
including the consideration of marginal cost pricing.  Relatively little came of these 
proceedings, with a few states implementing voluntary time-of-use pricing tariffs and 
Title I is has now largely been forgotten.   
Title II of PURPA has had a much more significant effect on the organization and 
regulation of the electric power industry which, in the long run, should ensure that retail 
prices reflect the competitive market value (marginal cost) of electricity.  Title II of 
PURPA required electric utilities to purchase electricity supplied by “Qualifying 
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Facilities” (QF) producing electricity using cogeneration technology, renewable and 
waste fuels.9  Consistent with the Ford and RFF studies, the objective of Title II of 
PURPA was to stimulate electricity production from more thermally efficient 
cogeneration plants and to encourage the use of renewable and waste fuels in the 
production of electricity. The states were required to develop regulations to ensure that 
electric utilities would stand ready to purchase power from QFs at prices reflecting their 
“full avoided costs.”  After various court challenges, in the early 1980s, several states, 
including California, New York, all of the New England states, New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania, embraced PURPA with great enthusiasm, requiring utilities to pay high 
prices for QF power under 20 to 30 year contracts.     
As with natural gas, policies affecting the electricity sector have gone much 
further than the RFF and Ford studies had anticipated.   Provisions of the Energy Policy 
Act of 1992, subsequent initiatives by FERC, and initiatives by several states has placed 
the electric power industry on a difficult and ongoing path of restructuring to support 
competitive wholesale and retail markets for electricity (Joskow 2003).  Importantly, both 
the RFF and Ford studies completely missed the increasingly important role of natural 
gas and the central role of efficient combined-cycle gas turbine (CCGT) generating 
technology using natural gas in electricity generation and its role in evolving competitive 
wholesale power markets.  These developments in turn were stimulated by the decontrol 
of natural gas prices and the subsequent restructuring of the natural gas industry. 
c.  Vigorously pursue energy conservation:  There has certainly been no shortage 
of efforts to encourage energy efficiency improvements in the last 25 years. Whether they 
                                                 
9 A more detailed discussion can be found in Joskow (1989).   
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are exactly what the Ford and RFF studies had in mind is hard to say. Energy efficiency 
or conservation policies have relied on a combination of building and appliance 
efficiency standards, tax subsidies, direct subsidies implemented through utility energy 
efficiency programs, and other means.  The National Energy Policy and Conservation Act 
(NEPCA) was passed by Congress and signed by President Carter in late 1978, required 
the Department of Energy (DOE) to issue appliance efficiency standards for household 
appliances and charged the FTC with issuing appliance energy efficiency labeling rules.  
However, the Reagan administration opposed setting appliance efficiency standards 
required by this legislation and eventually promulgated “no-standard standards.”  The 
DOE was then sued for failing to enforce the National Energy and Conservation Act of 
1978 and a Court of Appeals ruled against the Reagan administration.   
Little progress was made in enacting federal appliance efficiency standards until 
the late 1980s, when new federal legislation was passed in response to a growing number 
of states enacting their own appliance efficiency standards and manufacturer concerns 
about the prospect of manufacturing appliances meeting numerous state-specific energy 
efficiency standards.  The proliferation of different individual state standards then led 
appliance manufacturers to seek uniform national appliance efficiency standards.  
Manufacturers and energy efficiency advocates (environmental groups) negotiated what 
became the National Appliance Energy Conservation Act in 1987.  This Act contains 
specific efficiency standards for 12 types of home appliances that are supposed to be 
updated from time to time by the DOE.  The first standards became effective in 1988 and 
1990 and the DOE has revised the statutory standards since then.  President Clinton 
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approved new standards for air conditioners and other appliances near the end of his 
second term.10 
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct92) was passed in October 1992.  It was 
the only piece of major energy policy legislation passed during the 1990s.  It grew out of 
legislation proposed by Congressman Phil Sharp entitled “The National Energy 
Efficiency Act of 1991” that was shaped and managed through the Congressional 
political thickets by Senators Johnston and Wallop.   Unlike the supply-side program 
oriented proposals focused on increasing supplies of conventional fossil fuels submitted 
to Congress in early 1991 by the G.W. Bush administration, and rejected by Congress in 
June 1991, EPAct92 paid much more attention to promoting energy conservation and 
renewable energy.  Among other things, EPAct92 provides tax and direct subsidies for 
energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies, requires new energy efficiency 
standards for buildings and industrial equipment, expands energy efficiency labeling 
requirements, and creates programs to improve energy efficiency in federal buildings. 
EPAct92 also made important changes in the Federal Power Act (FPA) and the Public 
Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) which helped to make subsequent electricity 
industry restructuring and competition initiatives feasible.  
Improving automobile fuel efficiency plays a big role in the RFF study. 
Automobile fuel efficiency standards were first established by the federal government in 
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 and a “gas guzzler” tax was included in 
the Tax Act of 1978, before the RFF and Ford studies were completed and the anticipated 
effects are incorporated in both studies.  The 1975 Act established Corporate Average 
                                                 
10 Though the standard for central air conditioners were partially rolled back later by the G.W. Bush 
administration. 
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Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards for each automaker, with domestically produced and 
imported vehicles counted as separate fleets.  For passenger cars, the CAFE standards 
started at 18 miles per gallon with the 1978 model year and gradually increased to 27.5 
miles per gallon for the 1985 model year.   For light trucks, including SUVs, the CAFE 
standard began at 17.2 miles per gallon in 1979 and rose to 20.5 miles per gallon by 
1987.  These standards are based on laboratory tests that follow EPA guidelines and have 
not changed since 1985 and 1987 respectively.  Efforts to tighten the CAFE standards 
have been opposed successfully by domestic automobile manufacturers for the last two 
decades, supported by scholarly studies that indicate that the implementation of the 
standards was very costly. 
d. Nuclear Power:  The RFF and Ford studies were just being completed when 
the accident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant (TMI) occurred in March 1979.  This 
reinforced already significant public opposition to nuclear power, leading to a temporary 
moratorium on the completion of new nuclear plants, and a temporary closure of some 
operating nuclear plants, pending a review of safety issues raised by the TMI accident.   
Delays and design changes following these reviews contributed to the already escalating 
costs of building nuclear power plants.  While acknowledging the escalation in costs, 
lengthening licensing and construction times, and poor operating performance of nuclear 
plants, both the RFF and Ford studies are quite favorable toward nuclear power, viewing 
it as being very competitive with new coal plants, and arguing that constraints on 
expanding nuclear power would be costly.  The RFF study seems to accept the DOE’s 
range of estimates for installed nuclear generating capacity of 256-396 Gwe (p. 423) in 
2000 and an overnight construction cost of about $530/kW in 1975 prices (about 
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$1500/Kw in 2002 prices) as being reasonable.  The RFF study recommends that the U.S. 
continue efforts to reduce the problems confronting expansion of nuclear power electric 
generating capacity.  It also argues that reprocessing nuclear fuel and breeder reactors 
will not be economical for many years into the future.  Finally, it recommends a 
continuation of efforts to define and improve long run nuclear options and to resolve 
waste disposal issues and has a thoughtful discussion of waste disposal and nuclear 
proliferation issues. 
Federal policy toward nuclear power during the 1980s and 1990s was primarily a 
policy of benign neglect, nether aggressively promoting nor actively discouraging 
construction of new nuclear power plants.  Legislation was passed in 1982, 1987 and 
1992 to identify and develop a site for storing waste fuel from civilian nuclear reactors 
consistent with the RFF studies’ recommendations.  Until the mid-1970s, U.S. energy 
policy assumed that separated plutonium from reprocessing would be recycled as a 
commercial nuclear fuel source.  However, concerns about the potential for plutonium to 
be diverted and converted to weapons material, which could lead to the proliferation of 
nations with nuclear weapons, resulted in a 1977 presidential ban on reprocessing used 
nuclear fuel in this country.  This ban and the supporting recommendations of the Ford 
study were  very controversial  at the time.  Although the ban was subsequently lifted, the 
high cost of reprocessing and the availability of cheap uranium continue to drive 
decisions not to reprocess in the United States.11 Federal funding for the development of 
the Clinch River Breeder Reactor was terminated in 1983 and the project cancelled due to 
technical problems, high construction costs, and the view --- shared with the RFF study --
                                                 
11 Nuclear Energy Institute Web Site. http://www.nei.org/doc.asp?docid=663.   
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- that reprocessing nuclear fuel to recycle plutonium would not be economical for many 
years.   
While the Clinton Administration was not a big booster of nuclear power, it 
supported a number of “pro-nuclear” initiatives, including developing and applying re-
licensing procedures for nuclear plants reaching the end of their initial license period and 
pre-certification of three new prototype nuclear plant designs.  Nevertheless, although 
EPAct92 provides funds for R&D on advanced nuclear technologies, the Clinton 
administration gradually reallocated R&D funding and policy initiatives away from coal 
and nuclear R&D programs toward programs focused on promoting energy efficiency 
and renewable energy supplies, and the development of more efficient vehicles that use 
fuels other than petroleum --- electricity, natural gas, and ethanol.  The George W. Bush 
administration has announced its intention to promote investments in new nuclear power 
plants more aggressively and to increase research funding for advanced nuclear 
technologies.  
e.  Synthetic Fuels from Coal, Solar Energy, and other alternative domestic 
energy resources:  In addition to nuclear, both the RFF and Ford studies supported 
carefully crafted government policies to stimulate development of alternative domestic 
energy resources.  They focus in particular on the production of synthetic fuels from 
coal12 and expanded use of solar energy, including wind.  They recognized that the 
production costs associated with these resources would be significantly higher than the 
then prevailing cost of oil, but they recommended a variety of basic research and modest 
demonstration initiatives to develop these technologies and to remove market and 
                                                 
12 By this time, the U.S. already had significant experience with failed synthetic fuels programs and one 
wonders how much this experience affected the studies’ policy recommendations. 
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regulatory barriers to their deployment.  The studies also recognized that the prospects for 
these alternative resources depended on both technological developments and the 
anticipated increase in prices for oil and natural gas materializing.  The Ford study was 
unsympathetic to large scale federal demonstration projects. 
In the last 25 years there has been a plethora of federal policies to encourage 
alternative fuels and fuel-use technologies with little to show for the efforts.  In June, 
1980 President Carter signed the Energy Security Act, consisting of six pieces of 
legislation: U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation Act, Biomass Energy and Alcohol Fuels 
Act, Renewable Energy Resources Act, Solar Energy and Energy Conservation Act, 
Geothermal Energy Act, and Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act.  These laws all 
provided an array of tax subsidies and direct subsidies for alternative energy supplies and 
to encourage energy efficiency.  From an economist’s perspective this was probably the 
low point in contemporary U.S. energy policy.  However, the synthetic fuel and shale oil 
programs, to which President Carter had committed $88 billion, were later abandoned as 
costs rose and oil and natural gas prices fell during the 1980s.13     
In addition to promoting energy efficiency as discussed above, EPAct92 includes 
a number of new programs to encourage renewable energy and alternative fuels.  Among 
other things the Act provides various tax subsidies to encourage electric vehicles, solar 
and geothermal energy production, alcohol fuels, and R&D funding for the 
commercialization of renewable energy technologies, including electric and hybrid 
vehicles, and various technologies for the generation of electricity from renewables on-
                                                 
13 A modest amount of research and development activity on coal gasification continues in connection with 
the integrated gas combined cycle technology that would use synthetic gas produced from coal in a 
combined cycle gas turbine as part of the Clean Coal Program. 
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grid and off-grid -- fuel cells, heat engines, superconductors and other technologies.  The 
Act also authorizes R&D expenditure for specified “clean coal” technologies. 
Energy policy during the Clinton administration was guided by the framework 
established in the Energy Policy Act of 1992 and was heavily influenced by the 
Administration’s environmental policy agenda, including concerns about global climate 
change.  It gradually reallocated R&D funding and policy initiatives away from coal and 
nuclear R&D programs toward programs focused on promoting energy efficiency and 
renewable energy supplies, and the development of more efficient vehicles that use fuels 
other than petroleum. Federal expenditures supporting energy efficiency, renewables, and 
alternative fuel vehicles increased significantly while funding for coal and nuclear 
technology declined.  However, the Clinton administration’s efforts in these areas were 
first hampered by federal budgetary constraints that placed pressure on the DOE’s 
budget.  After 1994, these initiatives were impeded by a Republican Congress that was 
hostile to the DOE in general and the Clinton administration’s favorite energy programs 
in particular.  Congress prohibited federal agencies from even studying tightening the 
existing vehicle fuel efficiency standards, placed roadblocks in the way of evaluating and 
tightening appliance efficiency standards as required by EPAct92, and rejected or cut 
back Administration proposals for tax subsidies for renewable energy and alternative fuel 
vehicles.  Congress also slowed down efforts by the Administration to shift funds toward 
renewable energy and energy efficiency programs.   
f. Rely on economic instruments --- emissions taxes and tradeable emissions 
permits --- to internalize environmental externalities.  Until the 1990s, there was little 
policy interest in using economists’ preferred instruments to control pollution.  However, 
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the Acid Rain Title of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 created a cap and trade 
system for emissions of sulfur dioxide from electric generating units.  Moreover, in 
response to obligations to reduce regional emissions of NOx provided for in the 1990 
Clean Air Act, an emissions trading system has been introduced in the Northeast and 
other regions of the country to control NOx emissions as well.  In the early 1990s, 
California also created a cap and trade system to control NOx and SO2 emissions 
(RECLAIM) in the South Coast Air Quality Management District.  These programs are 
generally viewed as having been successful in reducing costs while meeting 
environmental goals (Ellerman et. al. and Ellerman, Joskow and Harrison).  Economic 
instruments, especially cap and trade programs, to internalize environmental externalities 
are now widely accepted as attractive mechanisms to control pollution.   
The Ford study was clearly way ahead of its time in recognizing the need to better 
understand the effects on CO2 emissions on climate change.  After 25 years of research, 
most developed country’s energy policies are now closely linked with programs to 
control emissions of CO2.  Cap and trade programs are likely to play an important role in 
CO2 emissions control programs in Europe and (eventually) in the United States and 
provide a framework for integrating developing countries into global CO2 emissions 
control program. 
g. Prepare for oil supply disruptions: The Ford study recommended that the U.S. 
lead a world effort to prepare for short-term disruptions in world oil markets by 
developing an effective stockpile program and by using market forces to manage 
stockpiles and crises.  The establishment of a U.S. strategic petroleum reserve predates 
the RFF and Ford studies.  The Energy Policy and Conservation Act signed by President 
 26
Ford in 1975 authorized the creation of a Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) containing 
up to 1 billion barrels of petroleum.14   The SPR is located in underground salt caverns 
along the Gulf of Mexico and now has an authorized capacity of about 700 million 
barrels of oil with about 600 million barrels actually in storage as of June 2003.  The Act 
gives the President the authority to authorize releases from the SPR when the President 
determines that there is a severe supply interruption leading to a “national energy 
shortage” (full drawn down) or other circumstances that the President determines are 
likely to lead to significant domestic or international shortages of significant duration that 
would have adverse effects on the economy (limited drawdown).  Through the 
International Energy Agency, the U.S. has agreements to coordinate withdrawals from 
reserves with other countries. 
 Oil has been withdrawn from the SPR in response to international oil supply 
disruptions only once --- during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 when 17.3 million 
barrels were sold from the Reserve.  Oil has also been withdrawn in two test sales (1985 
and 1990) and six times in the form of oil exchange arrangements authorized by the 1975 
Act.15  Most of the oil exchange actions have been in response to localized domestic 
supply disruptions, the latest in 2002 in response to disruptions in commercial oil 
shipments to Gulf Coast ports caused by Hurricane Lili.  Non-emergency sales from the 
Reserve were also authorized by Congress in 1996 to raise revenues for the Federal 
government. 
The SPR is not exactly what the RFF study had in mind.  The RFF study favored 
more reliance on private stockpiles.  It also recommended the development of protocols 
                                                 
14 http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/usa.html  
15 http://www.fe.doe.gov/spr/ 
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for withdrawing oil from any strategic reserves that were based on other than 
hypothetical quantity measures of “shortfalls.”   Instead, the study recommended basing 
releases on large increases in prices from recent historical levels to cushion the effects of 
supply disruptions.  It also recommended the development of clear release criteria before 
new international oil disruptions occur.  Both of these recommendations were and are 
controversial and have largely been ignored as have more recent analyses supporting 
similar decision rules.  
 
V.  ENERGY DEMAND AND SUPPLY 25 YEARS LATER   
 
 a. Energy Consumption 
 Both the RFF and Ford studies were (wisely) cautious about making projections 
of the future paths of energy supply and demand under alternative policy scenarios.  Yet 
both studies offer some forecasts for energy consumption and supply in 2000.  In the 
spirit of the paper by Koomey et. al. in this volume, it is very instructive to compare what 
these studies thought would happen with what actually did happen and to try to 
understand the sources of the differences.  The RFF study focused on the “Mid-range” 
projections of energy consumption by sector for the year 2000 displayed in Table 1 and I 
will focus on it here as well.16  The forecasts are based on a detailed analysis of a few 
sectors, less detailed analyses of others, the assumption that real GDP would grow at an 
average rate of 3.2% per year, and the Census’ mid-range population forecast of a 260.5 
million person U.S. population in 2000.  In RFF mid-range forecast is for 114 quads of 
energy consumption in 2000. 
                                                 
16 The RFF study (page 203) suggests a lower bound of 100 quads and an upper bound of 140 quads for 
total U.S. energy consumption in 2000.   
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The Ford study took a more aggregate “top-down” approach based on 
assumptions about future energy prices, demand elasticities, GDP growth, and reductions 
in the energy/GDP ratio to come up with an aggregate projection for U.S. energy 
consumption in 2000.   For example, assuming real GDP would growth at 3% per year, 
that real energy prices would increase by nearly 50%, that the energy to GDP ratio would 
fall to about 22 BTU per dollar of GDP (at 1978 price levels) by the year 2000.  The Ford 
study forecasts total U.S. energy consumption of about 120 quads in 2000, very close to 
the aggregate consumption forecast provided by the RFF study.  Both recognize that such 
forecasts have large uncertainties associated with them. 
 Actual U.S. energy consumption in 2000 was just under 100 quads.17  Thus, the 
RFF and Ford forecasts were 15% to 20% too high in the aggregate.  At first blush, given 
the uncertainties and long forecast period, the forecasts do not seem to be too far off the 
mark. However, the studies forecast that energy consumption would grow by 40 to 45 
quads between 1976 and 2000, while it actually grew by only 25 quads.  So, in terms of 
growth in energy consumption, the forecasts were high by 60 to 80%.  The difference 
cannot be explained by economic and population growth drivers.  Real GDP increased by 
an average of about 3.2% per year during this period which is consistent with the 
assumptions underlying the RFF forecast (3% real GDP growth rate in the Ford forecast) 
and population grew faster (280 million rather than 260 million people in 2000) than 
assumed the RFF study assumed.  Moreover, the differences between the forecasts and 
actual energy utilization for some of the individual consuming sectors are even larger. 
These differences are instructive both with regard to the effects of energy policies and 
                                                 
17 Actual U.S. energy consumption in 2000 was at the low end of the forecasts made by energy studies 
released in the late 1970s (Schurr , pp. 204-217). 
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unanticipated changes in the structure of the U.S. economy on energy consumption 
patterns. 
TABLE 1 
RFF STUDY FORECAST OF ENERGY CONSUMPTION IN 2000 
 
 
Sector   RFF Forecast (Quads)   2000 Actual (Quads) 
 
Residential 
 Space heating    8.0        6.2  
 Other   14.0      14.3 
 TOTAL   22.0    20.5 
 
Commercial    21.8    17.2 
 
Industrial 
 Process Steam  16.4       4.1 (1998) 
 Other   31.0     28.5 
 TOTAL   47.4    32.6 
 
Transportation 
 Passenger vehicles 7.0       15.0   
 Freight   5.3         6.0   
 Air   3.3         3.6   
 Other     -         2.0   
 
 TOTAL   15.6    26.7 
 
Other       7.0      2.0 
 
TOTAL    114    99 
 
 
Sources: Schurr, et. al. , Table 6-3; Annual Review of Energy 2001 and Annual Energy 
Outlook 200 3, U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
 
 The RFF forecast for residential sector consumption in 2000 is off (high) by only 
about 10%.  RFF anticipated significant improvements in the efficiency of home heating 
systems, forecasting a 10% reduction in energy used for space heating despite increasing 
population and per capita real income.  In fact, residential space heating use declined by 
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about 23%, twice the decline reflected in the RFF forecast, despite population growth 
greater and price increases smaller than assumed there.18  Thus, energy efficiency 
improvements have been greater than expected, probably reflecting appliance efficiency 
standards, energy efficiency labeling and new building codes, since realized energy 
prices were lower than forecast (see below).  The forecast for other residential energy 
uses, based on an assessment of other studies and incorporating significant improvements 
in energy efficiency are right on target.   
 The RFF forecasts for industrial energy consumption in 2000 are about 30% 
higher than the realized level of energy consumption in the industrial sector. The RFF 
study examines process steam use (about 35% of industrial energy use in 1976) in detail 
to yield a mid-range forecast of about 16 quads of energy associated with process steam 
in 2000.  For the rest of the industrial sector, the forecasts simply assumed that the 
manufacturing sector would grow at a rate 20% faster than GDP and that energy 
efficiency would continue to improve at the pre 1973-74 embargo rate.   
The difference between actual industrial energy consumption and what was 
forecast by RFF is probably due primarily to changes in the structure of the economy.  
The manufacturing sector did not grow faster than GDP as was assumed, but more 
slowly.  In 1978, manufacturing accounted for 22.5% of GDP while in 2000 it accounted 
for 15.8% of GDP.  Moreover, the share of some of the most energy intensive sectors 
(primary metals, paper and allied products, lumber and wood products, stone, clay and 
glass) shrunk from 26% of manufacturing GDP in 1980 to 18% of manufacturing GDP in 
                                                 
18To 1997, the last year for which EIA data are available.   I cannot reproduce the residential space heating 
numbers from the RFF study.  They report 8.8 quads in 1976.  The EIA reports about 7.4 quads in 1978 and 
6.0 quads in 2000, assuming that electricity is produced with 10,000btu/Kwh. 
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2000.  It is likely that improvements in energy efficiency were also greater than had been 
anticipated.  
  The RFF forecasts for energy consumption in the Commercial sector in 2000 is 
about 25% higher than realized consumption. The RFF forecasts were based on Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) studies which incorporated assumptions consistent 
with a 3.2% real GDP growth rate and real energy price increases of 1.6% per year.   
Without going back into the details of the ORNL model, it is hard to know what the 
sources of the difference lie. Higher prices than forecast or slower economic growth do 
not explain the difference since actual prices were lower and actual growth of the 
Commercial sector higher than forecast. Commercial energy consumption reflects energy 
consumption decisions by a wide range of industries, including wholesale and retail trade, 
finance, insurance and real estate, and “services.” The share of these components of GDP 
as a whole increased significantly between 1978 and 2000 (from 43% to 57% of GDP).   
As with the residential sector, the commercial sector should have benefited from 
improvements in space heating, cooling and lighting efficiency in buildings. The 
changing mix of commercial activity and greater improvements in energy efficiency also 
probably account for a significant fraction of the difference. 
 Finally, turning to transportation, the RFF study projected a decline of about 30% 
in energy used by passenger vehicles and an increase of about 33% in energy used in 
freight transport with overall energy consumption in transportation being flat between 
1978 and 2000.   In fact, energy consumption in the transportation sector increased by 
about 30% between 1978 and 2000.19  This is the only sector where the RFF forecast was 
                                                 
19 The energy consumption for transportation reported in the RFF study do not match the EIA numbers.  
For 1976 (the year used in the RFF study), RFF report transportation sector consumption of about 15.6 
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too low. Most of the difference is associated with energy consumed in personal 
transportation vehicles.  The RFF forecasts are based on a series of assumption about 
growth in the number of vehicles per capita, miles traveled per vehicle, and vehicle fuel 
efficiency that lead to the projection that vehicle miles traveled would increase by 38% 
between 1976 and 2000.  In fact, vehicle miles traveled increased by 150% between 1977 
and 2001 based on U.S. Highway Administration data.20 The number of passenger 
vehicles per capita and the average miles driven per passenger vehicle are all much 
higher than assumed by RFF.  In addition, the RFF study assumed that the 27.5 mile per 
gallon CAFE standard would be achieved by all passenger vehicles by 2000.  While new 
passenger vehicles have met the 27.5 mile/gallon CAFE standard (based on laboratory 
tests) when they are sold, in practice passenger vehicles got only 22.0 miles per gallon in 
actual use.  Moreover, while the RFF study clearly noted the existence of the “light truck 
loophole” (page 151) and even the potential increased popularity of “trucklike” vehicles 
for personal transportation use, the shift to SUVs, with lower fuel economy standards, 
was not reflected in the forecasts.   
 In summary, the RFF and Ford studies used mid-range forecasts that implied that 
aggregate U.S. energy utilization per dollar of real GDP would fall by about 1/3 between 
the late 1970s and 2000.   In fact energy utilization per dollar of GDP fell by about 10% 
more than predicted (36% vs. 33%).  As we can see from Figure 1, however, the ratio fell 
more quickly from 1978 to 1985 (when energy prices were very high and the effects of 
                                                                                                                                                 
quads while EIA reports 19 quads.  So, to the extend that RFF was forecasting from a different base this 
explains part of the difference between the forecast and actual numbers.  Accordingly, I will focus on the 
differences between the forecast and actual percentage changes in consumption. 
20http://nhts.ornl.gov/2001/html_files/trends_ver6.shtml.  Accessed June 8, 2003. 
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the CAFE standards were kicking in)) than it has fallen since 1985 (as energy prices have 
fallen).   The accuracy of the forecasts for the individual sectors is much more variable. 
 b. Fuel Use  
 The RFF study also contains a breakdown of the projected use of primary fuels 
and electricity by end-use consumers consistent with the demand forecast (page 195).  
Table 2 compares the projected breakdown with the actual breakdown in 2000. 
 
TABLE 2 
PRIMARY ENERGY CONSUMPTION BY SOURCE IN 2000 
 
  1976   RFF 2000        ACTUAL 2000  
 
Coal    5.5%  10%     2% 
Gas  23.1%  17%   19% 
Oil (liquids) 42.6%  33%   38% 
Electricity 28.7%  40%    39 % 
 
 
Note 1:  Electricity’s share is based on primary inputs into the production of electricity 
Note 2:  1976 and RFF columns from RFF study Table 6-4. 
Note 3:  Actual 2000 column calculated from Annual Review of Energy 2001, U.S. 
Energy Information Administration. 
 
 The overall trend toward electrification of the economy envisioned by the RFF 
study has been realized.  However, the utilization of coal in end-use applications (i.e., 
aside from the production of electricity) has fallen rather than increased, reflecting the 
changing composition of the economy discussed earlier, environmental regulations, and 
the availability of relatively inexpensive natural gas as a boiler fuel in industry.  
Accordingly, natural gas use is higher than predicted.  As discussed previously, 
petroleum consumption is significantly higher than the RFF study projected, due 
primarily to much higher than predicted petroleum use in personal transportation.   
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 Neither the RFF nor the Ford studies provides a prediction for the primary fuels 
that would be used to generate electricity in 2000.  However, the focus of both studies is 
on nuclear and coal as being the primary economical alternatives for generating 
electricity, combined with industrial cogeneration, and with some longer run possibilities 
for renewable (wind and solar) applications.  Neither study saw any future for natural gas 
in the generation of electricity, and while combined-cycle gas turbine (CCGT) generating 
technology is mentioned in the RFF study, it does not play a significant role in the visions 
of the future offered by the RFF and Ford studies.  I do not think that the RFF study’s 
perspective on the use of natural gas to generate electricity reflected the widespread view 
prevailing at the time that natural gas was a “premium fuel” that should not be “wasted” 
to generate electricity.  Rather, it reflects the view that coal and nuclear power would be 
less costly sources of electricity.   
 Table 3 provides the breakdowns of fuels used to generate electricity in 1978 and 
2001. The fuel use in the generation of electricity is broadly consistent with the policy 
recommendations in the RFF and Ford studies. Despite tougher environmental 
requirements coal use in electricity generation has risen steadily since 1978.  Coal and 
nuclear have increased their shares of electricity generation from 47% to 72%, while 
petroleum has almost disappeared as a fuel for generating electricity.  However, natural 
gas’ share of electricity generation is higher than it was in 1978 and is projected to 
continue to rise in the next twenty five years to about 30% in 2025 (U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) 2003).  About 150,000 Mw of new generating capacity 
has been completed in the U.S. in the last five years, almost all of it CCGT or single-
cycle gas turbine generating facilities (Joskow 2003).   The important role of natural gas, 
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combined-cycle gas turbine generating capacity, and the restructuring of the electricity 
industry to rely on competitive wholesale markets are developments that were missed 
completely by both the Ford and RFF studies but are, in a sense, a direct but unforeseen 
consequence of the recommendations to decontrol oil and natural gas prices, to bring 
electricity prices to market levels, to stimulate cogeneration,21 and to rely more on 
competitive market forces. 
TABLE 3 
FUELS USED TO GENERATE ELECTRICITY 
 
    1978   2001 
 
Coal    44%   51% 
Natural Gas   14%   16% 
Oil    17%     3% 
Nuclear   13%   21% 
Hydro    13%     6% 
Renewable      1.8% (1989)    2.1%  
 
Cogeneration     7.3% (1989)    9.7% 
 
 
NOTE 1:  Consistent data for renewable energy sources other than conventional hydro 
and for electricity produced as part of a cogeneration process are not available prior to 
1989 
NOTE 2:  The renewable row excludes conventional hydro 
NOTE 3:  The fuels used for cogeneration are included in the fuel categories above.  62% 
of the cogenerated electricity is produced with natural gas. 
 
Source:  Annual Review of Energy 2001, Energy Information Administration. 
 
 The quantity of electricity generated from nuclear power has increased 
significantly over the last twenty years as 45 plants under construction or announced in 
1979 were completed and as nuclear plant operators were able to increase the operating 
                                                 
21 PURPA stimulated investment cogeneration facilities which in turn stimulated interest in the 
development of combined cycle generating technology.  These developments stimulated interest in 
expanding competitive opportunities for independent power producers ( Joskow 2000).  However, the 
penetration of cogeneration in 2000 is significantly lower than RFF’s assessment of its economic potential.  
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performance of the nuclear plants from average capacity factors of 65% in 1978 to 
average capacity factors of 89% in 2001.  However, all of these post-1979 plants had 
been announced by the time that the Ford and RFF studies were released.  No new plants 
were announced after 1979, about half of the nuclear plants that were under construction 
or had been announced by 1979 were subsequently cancelled, and about a dozen 
operating nuclear plants were closed during the 1980s and 1990s.  Current nuclear 
generating capacity is less than half of the lower bound government forecasts cited in the 
RFF study.   The nuclear plants that were completed during this period were wildly over 
budget and, contrary to the forecasts in the RFF and Ford studies, investments in new 
nuclear plants are now been widely perceived to be uneconomical compared to coal and 
gas-fueled alternatives.  No nuclear power plants are under construction in the U.S. and 
few are under construction elsewhere in the world.   As a result, nuclear’s share of 
electricity production is projected by EIA (2003) to fall from 20% to about 15% by 2025. 
 The RFF study contains detailed analyses of synthetic fuels and solar energy 
applications (including wind) and the Ford study devoted a lot of attention to solar 
energy’s potential.  Both studies recognized that costs would have to fall and/or the prices 
of substitute energy supply sources rise for renewable energy to be competitive absent 
special subsidies.  Public policies were subsequently implemented to promote both 
synthetic fuels and solar energy, as well as other renewable energy supply technologies.  
As already noted, the synthetic fuels program was largely abandoned in 1986.  Its 
remnants can be found in the clean coal program’s initiatives on coal gasification for use 
in combined-cycle power stations and some controversial tax subsidies for synthetic fuel 
technology.  A variety of tax and direct subsidies have been given to solar and other 
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renewable energy sources and these sources were favored for use in generating electricity 
through the implementation of PURPA.   
 Despite all of these policy initiatives, renewable energy, excluding conventional 
hydroelectric energy, accounts for only about 3% of total energy supplied to consumers 
today.  About 2/3 of this is accounted for by wood used primarily in space heating.  Solar 
and wind energy account for only 0.1% of energy supplied in the U.S.  However, 
renewable energy supplies, especially from wind, are growing rapidly as a consequence 
of various subsidies provided in EPAct92 and state-mandated purchase obligations, and 
supplies are projected to rise to about 6% of total energy consumed by 2025 (EIA 2003).      
  c. Energy Prices 
The Ford and RFF studies were motivated primarily by three interrelated 
problems:  increasing dependence on imports of petroleum, a long run trend of rising 
energy prices, and the impacts of energy production and use on the environment.  Both 
studies envisioned energy prices rising over the following 20 years, but to a long run 
level no more than double the prices prevailing in 1979.   Soon after the studies were 
published, energy prices began to rise rapidly in response to disruptions in oil supplies 
from Iran.  However, energy prices peaked in the mid-1980s and then fell rapidly.  
Overall, energy prices were at about the same real level in 2000 as they were in 1979.  
EIA projects real annual end-use energy prices to be about constant over the next 25 
years and oil prices to stay below the $40-$60 range (2002 price levels) projected by the 
Ford study (EIA 2003, p. 123).  Figure 2 displays the real price of crude oil, natural gas, 
and a fossil fuel price index over time.  Following the price break around 1984-85, prices 
have moved around their 1979 levels, with considerable volatility.   Figure 3 displays a 
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similar pattern for retail gasoline prices.  Real retail electricity prices display similar 
patterns, with less volatility.  In summary, contrary to expectations in 1979, real delivered 
energy prices were about the same in 2000 as they were in 1979.   
d.  Environmental Indicators 
The impacts of energy production and use and the interactions between energy 
and environmental policies were a central concern of both studies.  They both argued that 
it would be feasible to accommodate increased energy consumption without increasing 
damage to the environment and to do so without dramatically increasing the cost of 
energy to consumers.  Table 4 provides data on emissions and air quality for the primary 
criterion pollutants covered by the Clear Air Act.  It is clear that air quality has improved 
significantly over the last 20 years in almost all dimensions.22  The Ford study recognized 
that CO2 emissions associated with the combustion of fossil fuels was a potential, though 
highly uncertain, source of climate change.  The study recommended more study of the 
relationship between CO2 emissions and global climate change.  It also recommended 
putting off any policies to restrict coal use on account of CO2 emissions.  The U.S. has 
followed both components of this recommendation.  U.S. CO2 emissions have increased 
by over 20% since 1980 with most of the increase occurring after 1990. 
 e. Oil Imports 
The RFF and Ford studies were very concerned about rising dependence on 
foreign oil.  In 1979 the U.S. was importing about 8 million barrels per day of petroleum.   
In 2001, the U.S. imported 10.6 million barrels of petroleum per day, a trend that the 
studies did not have in mind.  As world oil prices rose after 1979, domestic petroleum 
production increased slightly, petroleum demand fell significantly and imports fell to 
                                                 
22 Air quality and emissions patterns may differ because air quality is monitored primarily in dense urban 
areas.  Acidic deposition has also declined significantly since 1995 when the new SO2 cap and trade 
program went into effect. 
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about 4 million barrels per day.  As world oil prices then fell during the second half of the 
1980s these supply and demand patterns reversed.  See Figure 4.  At the same time, 
imports of natural gas, primarily from Canada have increased significantly as well. 
TABLE 4 
AIR QUALITY AND EMISSIONS 1982-2001 
 
     Air Quality 
    Percentage Change 
 
Pollutant  1982-2001  1992-2001 
NO2       -24%     -11% 
O3 1-hour      -18      -  3 
O3 8-hour      -11         0 
SO2       -52      -35 
PM10         N/A     -14 
CO       -62      -38 
Pb       -94      -25 
 
     Emissions 
    Percentage Change 
 
Pollutant  1982-2001  1992-2001 
NOx       +9%         -  3% 
VOC       -16      -  8 
SO2       -25      -24 
PM10       -51      -13 
CO         0       + 6 
Pb       -93      -  5 
 
Source:  Latest Findings on National Air Quality: 2001 Status and Trends, U.S. EPA. 
September 2002. 
 
 If one were to judge the success of U.S. energy policy over the last 20 years solely 
by looking at whether oil imports had increased or decreased, one would have to 
conclude that it has been a failure.  However, this is too narrow a perspective even if we 
focus only on the “energy security” goal among the broader set of goals for energy 
policy.  While oil imports have increased, the importance of oil in the economy has 
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declined dramatically.  About 50% less oil per dollar of real GDP is consumed in the U.S. 
today than was the case in 1979.  Almost no oil is used to generate electricity or to heat 
homes and businesses.  Moreover, the relative importance of oil produced in the Persian 
Gulf has declined since 1979 as oil producing areas were developed in other parts of the 
world.   We have a Strategic Petroleum Reserve, though it has been used rarely and 
erratically.  Finally, we have had two disruptions in oil supplies in the last dozen years 
due to war in the Persian Gulf region.  Oil prices rose in connection with both of them, 
but (apparently) the damage to the economy was not significant or long lasting.  Indeed, 
many economists have questioned whether the economic costs of oil supply disruptions, 
in terms of macroeconomic and associated aggregate welfare impacts, are nearly as large 
as policymakers and the public have generally assumed.   
 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The RFF and Ford studies have stood the test of time quite well; and “quite well” 
is hardly a poor grade when projecting trends and articulating policy recommendations 
and their effects predicated on the complex interplay of demographic, economic, 
technological, and environmental factors over long time periods. The framework and 
policy perspective remain relevant today.  There are few things in this book that one 
looks back on and says “big mistake.”  Many of the studies’ recommendations have been 
reflected in national energy policies.  The country is now reaping the benefits of the end of 
many inefficient energy policies first implemented during the 1970s and early 1980s and 
subsequently abandoned: oil and gas price controls, fuel-use restrictions, protectionist 
policies for oil refiners, and publicly funded mega-projects to promote specific supply 
sources all came to an end.  Because much of the regulatory apparatus of the 1970s and early 
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1980s had been dismantled by 1990, some of the tools for doing mischief in response to 
energy supply and price shocks were not readily available to respond (inefficiently) to oil 
price shocks in 1990-91 and oil and gas price shocks in 2000, 2001, and 2002.  This made it 
easier for the economy to adapt smoothly to changes in supply and demand conditions.  
Environmental policies are being implemented more efficiently than could have been 
imagined in 1979.       
There are important energy consumption and use trends that the studies got right.  
Significant opportunities to reduce the energy intensity of the economy have been 
demonstrated.  This was accomplished with much smaller price increases than the studies 
anticipated.  Coal use has steadily increased in the generation of electricity while air 
quality has improved.  Nuclear energy plays a significant role in supplying electricity, 
though the studies underestimated the costs of building nuclear power plants and 
overestimated investment in new nuclear capacity.  The studies were probably too 
optimistic about the costs of synthetic fuels and solar energy, though they included little 
of either in their 2000 supply forecasts.   They were not optimistic enough about the 
positive effects on supply and prices of natural gas price decontrol and the subsequent 
restructuring of the natural gas industry.   They did not see the dramatic changes in the 
electric power industry, driven in part by the availability of cheap natural gas and the 
technological innovations making it economical to use natural gas efficiently to generate 
electricity   The study leaders’ primary disappointments would probably be with the large 
increase in consumption of petroleum in personal transportation and the increasing 
dependence on foreign oil produced in unstable areas of the world. These studies 
continue to contain much wisdom that is relevant today as we embark on another round 
of energy policymaking and implementation. 
FIGURE 1
ENERGY CONSUMPTION PER DOLLAR OF REAL GDP
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Source: Annual Review of Energy 2001, Energy Information Administration
FIGURE 2
REAL PRODUCTION PRICE FOR FOSSIL FUEL
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FIGURE 3
Real Retail Gasoline Prices (All Grades)
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FIGURE 4
Petroleum Supplies
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